Water Crisis in Sindh: A Historical Perspective and Current Challenges

The residents of Sindh are grappling with critical issues of water shortage and environmental decline. Before 1960, the Indus River’s flow averaged 94 million acre-feet annually, consistently adding land to the coastline. Today, coastal erosion periodically engulfs vast tracts of fertile land in the districts of Badin, Sujawal, and Thatta, and even threatens Karachi.

The reduced annual water flows have devastated Sindh, with sea intrusion claiming over three million acres of productive land since the construction of the Mangla and Tarbela Dams. Currently, the river’s outflow frequently falls below the bare minimum of 7.3 million acre-feet. Regrettably, the once-mighty Indus often dries up before reaching the sea.

The Indus River System: A Contested History

For millennia, the Indus River served as the sole resource for Sindh. The concept of an Indus River ‘System’ emerged in 1945, devised by the British in collaboration with the Unionist Government of Punjab. Earlier, in preparation for the subjugation of Sindh, Allah Bux Soomro, a courageous and independent chief minister, was ousted in 1942.

With only three seats in the 60-member Sindh Assembly, Hidayatullah’s party signed the contentious Sindh-Punjab Water Agreement of 1945. This agreement provided the basis for the Indus River ‘System’, which now included the Indus and its five tributaries: Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas.

Previously, the undivided Punjab province utilized water from these five rivers, excluding the Indus. Hydrologically and geographically, the Indus is a distinct river. Until 1945, Sindh held exclusive rights to the Indus’s water.

The Impact of Amalgamation and Water Sharing

Combining the Indus with other rivers and distributing the pooled waters created grounds for disputes and significant inter-provincial conflict. Nature had ensured a fair distribution, with Sindh historically using Indus waters exclusively and Punjab drawing from the other five rivers, provided that Punjab did not disrupt water flow into the Indus at Panjnad.

This arrangement maintained separate water systems for Sindh and Punjab. However, the British pursued their colonial objectives. Consequently, under the 1945 Agreement, Punjab and Sindh were each allocated 48% of the Indus’s waters, with 5-6% of Punjab’s share going to NWFP (now KP) and the remaining 4.0% to Balochistan.

The 1945 Agreement established a dispute resolution mechanism between Sindh and Punjab, with decisions made by consensus, granting each equal voting rights. The federal government acted as the referee.

The Indus Basin Water Treaty and its Consequences

In 1960, under the urging of the World Bank, General Ayub Khan approved the Indus Basin Water Treaty with India. For a relatively small sum of $200 million, General Ayub Khan ceded the waters of the Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej to India in perpetuity.

In return, Pakistan obtained the Mangla and later Tarbela Dams, designed, constructed, and initially operated by the world’s most expensive consultants, contractors, engineers, and suppliers, financed by World Bank loans.

Like many dictators, Ayub sought to build massive infrastructure projects during his tenure, aiming to gain support in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab. The Mangla and Tarbela dams were built on the Jhelum and Indus rivers, respectively.

Following the allocation of three rivers to India, western Punjab was supplied by the Jhelum and Chenab. Punjab was compensated with water from the Indus through new diversionary offtakes like the Jinnah and Chashma Barrages, and the Thal Canal, which severely impacted water flows to Sindh.

The 1991 Water Accord and Subsequent Disputes

In 1990, another government was established in Islamabad and Sindh to push through the 1991 Water Accord, enacting the Indus River System Authority (IRSA) Act of 1992, replacing the 1945 Sindh–Punjab Water Agreement.

The PPP opposed this policy, foreseeing future discord between the provinces. Since 1992, water disputes have escalated.

Both the Water Accord 1991 and the IRSA Act 1992 were implemented under unrepresentative governments influenced by a powerful military-civil-bureaucracy-feudal cartel.

Punjab managed to retain its dominant share from the 1945 agreement, maintaining 48% of the water. Sindh’s share, which should have been 66% (in the absence of Indian Punjab), was reduced to 42%, while KP and Balochistan retained 5.8% and 3.8%, respectively.

The water dispute resolution under the IRSA Act remained unfavorable to Sindh. Before 1991, Sindh, with a 48% share of Indus waters, had equal decision-making power with Punjab, while the other provinces and Islamabad had no vote. The 1945 Sindh Punjab Waters Agreement ensured Sindh’s equal stake with Punjab, with the British government as the referee.

Post-1991, the federal government, previously without a share of Indus waters, became a party in water issues, exacerbating disputes. After considerable efforts by the PPP, other parties, and civil society, the federal government conceded in 2000 that the federal member of IRSA would be appointed from Sindh, being the lower riparian.

The notification from 2000 is protected under Article 270AA of the constitution. The 17th Amendment suspended the contentious Water Accord, granting Sindh some relief with two out of five members.

However, this practice ceased in 2014, leading to a challenge in the Sindh High Court. In 2017, the SHC ruled in favor of Sindh, affirming the constitutional protection and mandating the appointment of the federal member of IRSA from Sindh. The federal government’s appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court in 2021.

Current Concerns and Controversies

The federal government has yet to appoint a member to IRSA from Sindh. Without the constitutionally mandated two members from Sindh in IRSA, a ‘Water Availability Certificate’ was issued for the Cholistan and Thal Canal(2) project on January 24, 2024, during the caretaker government.

The Sindh government opposed this action, and ECNEC has yet to approve the project. Sindh’s appeal is pending in the Council of Common Interests and can be challenged under Article 155. No scheme can be initiated until this legal process is complete.

Reports indicate that the Punjab government has commenced digging at the site, which is deemed unconstitutional and illegal, raising concerns in Sindh about the bypassing of constitutional forums. Lawful construction requires decisions by ECNEC, CCI, or a joint session of parliament under Section 8 of the IRSA Act, 1992, and Article 155 of the constitution.

PPP Chairman Bilawal Bhutto Zardari has cautioned the federal government against constructing canals or inciting provincial animosity. He has called the Cholistan and Thal Canal (phase II) a divisive issue and demanded its cancellation.

President Asif Ali Zardari expressed similar concerns during a joint session of parliament on March 10, 2025.

The people of Sindh are understandably concerned as the established water-sharing mechanism faces repeated violations. Continued disregard could negatively impact the environment, delta fertility, and water availability in Sindh’s cities, towns, and villages.